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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RONALD K. CLARK, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020215-CA 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: LUND'S TRIAL PERFORMANCE FELL BELOW A 
REASONABLE STANDARD OF PROFESSIONAL CARE. 
Contrary to the State's assertion in its opening brief, Randall Lund ("Lund"), trial 
counsel for Appellant Ronald K. Clark ("Clark"), did not perform up to reasonable 
standards of professional care as an attorney when he opted not to challenge Marilyn 
Milburn's ("Milburn") testimony under Utah Rules of Evidence 701 and 702 (2003), or 
Detective Alva Davis' ("Davis") testimony under Utah Rule of Evidence 704 . See 
United States Const, amend. VI (right to effective assistance of counsel): Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,129, 52 P.3d 
1210; see also Clark's Opening Brief ("AB") at Points I & II (argument regarding Lund's 
ineffectiveness for failure to challenge Milburn's and Davis' testimony). 
The State, in making its argument, does not address the merits of a challenge to 
Milburn's testimony under Rules 701 and 702, or Davis' testimony under Rule 704. See 
State's Brief ("SB") at P. 15. However, as noted in Clark's Opening Brief, Points I & II, 
their testimonies were not legally admissible under Rules 701, 702, and 704. Hence, 
Lund's decision falls below a reasonable standard of professional care to the extent that 
he failed to object to legally inadmissible evidence. 
The State also avers that a portion of Milburnfs testimony is not "relevant to 
defendant's claim on appeal." See State's Brief ("SB") at p. 16. The State specifically 
refers to the elements of Milburn's testimony where she describes a round-bottomed flask 
containing shredded paper, Clark's surveillance system, a gun and a small bottom of 
mercury located in the shed. SB 16. 
The State's claim in this regard is disingenuous. The specific reason that the State 
elicited this testimony from Milburn during its case in chief was to substantiate her 
conclusion that she observed a meth lab at Clark's house. Indeed, she kept referring 
back to her "meth lab training" as the reason why she felt the enumerated items were 
significant and indicative of a meth lab. R.284[67,74]. 
Further, the prosecutor used Milburn's testimony regarding the round-bottomed 
flask expressly in her closing argument to the jury that Clark was operating a meth lab. 
She stated: 
[Y]ou can infer that [Clark] intended to engage in a clandestine laboratory if he 
possessed a glass reaction vessel Let's talk about... a glass reaction vessel.. 
. You heard Marilyn Milburn testify she saw a round-bottomed flask with some 
netting kind of stuff on it, hanging from the ceiling, and it had shredded money in 
it. You have taken a look at it As you can tell, it is kind of yellowish,'too. It 
is not clear. You might wonder why that is. And I will submit to you that the 
reason is he has been cooking in [the flask]. And why is there paper in it? 
Actually, money is actually cloth. But dry it out. And the only thing between that 
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reaction vessel... and cooking another batch is getting the paper out of it. Easy 
to do. I bet you could do it back in the jury room if you wanted to. 
R.286[486-87]. 
The prosecutor similarly referred to the weapons located on Clark's property, 
including the gun testified to by Milburn, as part of the state's case. The State was 
required to establish that Clark had a firearm to secure a first degree conviction for 
operating a meth lab. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (Supp. 2001). Otherwise, the 
offense of operating a meth lab is a second degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37d-4 (Supp. 2001). 
The State's argument that Lund's failure to challenge Milburn's or Davis' 
testimony was professionally reasonable relies on the assumption that Lund made his 
decisions based on sound trial strategy. SB 20-27; see also. State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 
182, 186 (Utah 1990) (citing Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689) (noting that trial counsel has 
wide latitude in determining strategy of a case). Again, the State's argument is without 
merit. 
The only way to defend Clark's case was to challenge any statement from the 
State's witnesses that what they observed was a meth lab rather than a vast and eclectic 
collection of stuff strewn all over Clark's property. 
The State's case against Clark was purely circumstantial. It had no evidence that a 
lab was in operation or that a full lab was constructed on the property at the time that the 
officers searched Clark's property. In fact, all the State had as evidence were random 
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items that it alleged could be used for a meth lab in this case. 
Hence, allowing Milburn and Davis to offer conclusory statements that they saw 
the speculative meth lab cuts directly against sound strategy and was professionally 
irresponsible under the circumstances. As noted in Clark's opening brief, Lund could 
have made his objections quickly and outside the presence of the jury so as not to draw 
undue attention to the evidence. AB 31,35,42. In addition, Lund had a professional duty 
to ensure that those statements stayed out since they were legally inadmissible under 
Rules 701, 702 and 704. See AB Points I & II (discussing how Rules 701, 702, and 704 
prohibit the testimony in question). Consequently, Lund's failure to raise the necessary 
objections against the testimonies of Milburn and Davis cannot be excused as trial 
strategy, and his failure to make the objections constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel. See Templin. 805 P.2d at 186; Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687-88; U.S. Const, 
amend. VI.1 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, and for the reasons set forth in Clark's opening brief, 
Lund rendered prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of Clark's rights 
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Consequently, Clark 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial. 
1
 The State also challenges that Lund's omissions prejudiced the outcome of 
Clark's trial. See SB Point C. Clark submits on his opening brief, Point III, in response 
to the State's argument. 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this i&ay of June, 2003. 
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